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Abstract 
Over the last fifteen years, many states have implemented high-stakes tests as part of an effort to 
strengthen accountability for schools, teachers, and students. Predictably, there has been 
vigorous disagreement regarding the contributions of such policies to increasing test scores and, 
more importantly, to improving student learning. A recent study by Amrein and Berliner (2002a) 
has received a great deal of media attention. Employing various databases covering the period 
1990-2000, the authors conclude that there is no evidence that states that implemented high-
stakes tests demonstrated improved student achievement on various external measures such as 
performance on the SAT®, ACT, AP®, or NAEP. In a subsequent study in which they conducted 
a more extensive analysis of state policies (Amrein & Berliner, 2002b), they reach a similar 
conclusion. However, both their methodology and their findings have been challenged by a 
number of authors. In this article, I undertake an extended reanalysis of one component of 
Amrein and Berliner (2002a). We focus on the performance of states, over the period 1992 to 
2000, on the NAEP mathematics assessments for grades 4 and 8. In particular, we compare the 
performance of the high-stakes testing states, as designated by Amrein and Berliner, with the 
performance of the remaining states (conditioning, of course, on a state’s participation in the 
relevant NAEP assessments). For each grade, when we examine the relative gains of states over 
the period, we find that the comparisons strongly favor the high-stakes testing states. Moreover, 
the results cannot be accounted for by differences between the two groups of states with respect 
to changes in percent of students excluded from NAEP over the same period. On the other hand, 
when we follow a particular cohort (grade 4, 1992 to grade 8, 1996 or grade 4, 1996 to grade 8, 
2000), we find the comparisons slightly favor the low-stakes testing states, although the 
discrepancy can be partially accounted for by changes in the sets of states contributing to each 
comparison. In addition, we conduct a number of ancillary analyses to establish the robustness of 
our results, while acknowledging the tentative nature of any conclusions drawn from highly 
aggregated, observational data. 
 
Introduction 
Since its passage in January 2002, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act has already had 
a substantial influence on state and local education agencies as they develop accountability plans 
to win the approval of the U.S. Department of Education. In addition to the operational concerns 
of these agencies, as well as those of principals and teachers, there is considerable debate about 
the efficacy of externally mandated high-stakes testing in improving learning (Elmore, 2002; 
Lewis, 2002; Steinberg, 2003; Wolf, 2003). Indeed, most of the education and educational 
measurement community is doubtful that high-stakes testing will have a generally salutary effect 
on the quality of student learning (Linn, 2000; Mehrens, 1998), although there are contrasting 
views (Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, & Williamson, 2000). Given the level of disagreement, it is 
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natural for both supporters and opponents to look to extant data to buttress their positions. 
Inasmuch as a number of states have instituted high-stakes testing policies of various kinds over 
the last decade or more, there is a record of results that, presumably, can yield some insights into 
the likely impact of such policies.  
A recent, and much cited, example of this approach is the article by Amrein and Berliner 
(2002a). Employing some general criteria, they identify 18 states as having high-stakes testing 
policies and examine the achievement of their students on a number of measures, including the 
SAT® and the ACT, NAEP results in mathematics and reading, and Advanced Placement 
Program.® The rationale is that trends on the state tests cannot be relied upon as valid indicators 
of student learning (Linn, 2000) and, if learning is indeed taking place, then similar trends should 
be seen in other, related measures. Their overall conclusion was that “At the present time, there is 
no compelling evidence… that those policies result in transfer to the broader domains of knowledge 
and skill for which high-stakes test scores must be indicators” (p. 54). 
The authors are careful to point out some of problems with each of the measures as a 
basis for drawing conclusions about the impact of the states’ policies. NAEP results, for reasons 
discussed below, are perhaps the least objectionable, as well as being the most relevant to 
considerations related to the consequences of NCLB for elementary and middle schools. A close 
reading of the article, however, raises a number of methodological concerns and it is the purpose 
of this paper to examine those concerns through a reanalysis of the NAEP mathematics data and 
to explore the policy implications of the findings. 
Amrein and Berliner also produced a follow-up report (Amrein & Berliner, 2002b). In 
that paper, they carried out a more extensive policy analysis and identified 28 states as high-
stakes states. We defer discussion of this second report, as well as alternative views (e.g., Carnoy 
& Loeb, 2003; Raymond & Hanushek, 2003) to the Discussion section. 
There is always a danger that, in carrying out these analyses, we will forget the very real 
limitations on the conclusions we can draw. Accordingly, we enumerate them at the outset. First, 
we are working with observational data so that causal inferences are not warranted. Second, 
these 18 states (and the other 32) have engaged in a number of education initiatives in addition to 
their testing policies so that ascribing differences in NAEP results (solely or principally) to the 
impact of high-stakes testing is problematic. A similar difficulty arises in trying to explain the 
results of some states in terms of (apparent) attempts to “game the system” by, for example, 
increasing the proportion of SD/LEP students who are excluded from participating in NAEP. 
(SD/LEP refers to students with disabilities and/or students with limited English proficiency—
with both groups expected to perform below average.) 
Perhaps the most important consideration from the policy perspective is that for all the 
differences among state NAEP scores and state NAEP score changes, there is much greater 
variability within states—and probably more to be learned from trying to understand the sources 
of such within state differences. For an example, see Raudenbush, Fotiu, Cheong, and Ziazi 
(1995). That said, the current controversy about state level results demands that we address the 
question in as balanced a fashion as possible. 
We begin with a review the methodology of Amrein and Berliner (2002a) and then carry 
out a reanalysis of the cross-sectional data, followed by a reanalysis of the cohort data. Both 
reanalyses are repeated using the states’ 25th percentiles (rather than the states’ means) to 
ascertain the robustness of the results. The final section relates the findings to those in the recent 
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literature, offers some interpretations, as well as some cautions on drawing policy conclusions 
from data of this type. 
Reviewing Amrein and Berliner 
Amrein and Berliner (2002a) identified 18 states as having “… the most severe 
consequences, that is, the highest stakes associated with their K-12 testing policies” (p. 18). All 
the states had regulations making high school graduation contingent on passing a high school 
graduation exam. They also had various combinations of other stakes relating to grade promotion 
contingent on examination performance, making public annual school or district report cards, as 
well as rewards and sanctions for schools, teachers and students (see their Table 1, p. 18). One 
can certainly argue with their classification that, for example, includes Kentucky and 
Massachusetts among the low-stakes states. In the interests of maintaining comparability, 
however, we have retained their classification. 
The rationale for analyzing NAEP data is that NAEP is the only nationally administered 
achievement test—and one that students do not explicitly prepare for. Since 1990, states have 
had the option to participate in “State NAEP,” with scores reported on the same scale as National 
NAEP. Consequently, states can be compared in terms of their performance on NAEP over time. 
If increases in state test scores are valid indicators of improved skills, then one would expect to 
see corresponding increases in NAEP scores.  
Of course, there are some weaknesses to this approach. Student motivation to perform 
well on NAEP is likely not as great as it is on a high-stakes exam. (On the other hand, it is not 
clear why students in different states would experience differential reductions in motivation from 
the state test to NAEP.) States can have different policies on excluding SD/LEP students from 
participation in NAEP and also may differ in the extent to which the state assessment is aligned 
with the NAEP framework. Presumably, students in states with greater alignment might be 
expected to do better on NAEP than students in states with lesser alignment. On the other hand, 
use of SAT, ACT, or AP scores is very problematic. Aside from concerns about self-selection, it 
is difficult to make the case that the performance standards set by states would have had much 
impact on college-bound students. 
With respect to the timing of policies, Amrein and Berliner (2002a) only provide the year 
at which the high school graduation requirement became operative in each of the 18 states. They 
state explicitly that “The usefulness of the NAEP analyses that follow rests on the assumption 
that states’ other K-12 high-stakes testing policies were implemented at or around the same time 
as each state’s high school graduation exam” (p. 36). 
Their approach to the analysis of data can best be illustrated by an example. Using NAEP 
mathematics results for grade 4, they compute the change for the nation, and for each state, over 
the period 1992 to 2000. They then calculate the differential gain for each state as: 
 
State Gain = (change for state ‘92 to ‘00) - (change for nation ’92 to ‘00). 
 
A positive State Gain means that over this time period the state’s improvement on NAEP 
exceeded that of the nation. Conversely, a negative value means that the nation’s improvement 
exceeded that of the state. It is important to recognize that in the latter case, the change for the 
state could be positive but just not as large as the nation’s. 
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Using rounded values, Amrein and Berliner (2002a) find (see their Table 8) that for the 
eighteen high-stakes states they selected, there were 8 positive State Gains, 3 negative and 2 
zeroes. There were five states where data were declared “not available.” This is curious, as two 
states (Indiana and Minnesota) do have NAEP data available and we include them in our 
reanalysis. 
Amrein and Berliner (2002a) acknowledged this result appears to support the beneficial 
impact of high stakes testing. However, they argue that the association between State Gain and 
the change in the percent of students excluded from NAEP over the same time period (r = 0.39) 
undercuts the interpretability of the result. When, further, they combine the analyses for 1992 to 
1996 and 1996 to 2000 with the one for 1992 to 2000 (ignoring the dependency induced by the 
overlap in time), they reach the conclusion that “In short, when compared to the nation as a 
whole, high-stakes testing policies did not usually lead to improvement in the performance of 
students on the grade 4 NAEP math tests between 1992 and 2000” (p. 40). 
In the case of grade 8 NAEP mathematics, they find (see their Table 9) that, over the 
period 1990–2000, five states posted gains, four losses and one remained the same. Note that 
eight states are missing, so these results reflect the experiences of only slightly more than half 
the states of interest. After aggregating results over the periods 1990 to 1992, 1992 to 1996 and 
1996 to 2000 (again ignoring the overlap) and pointing to the problem of differential changes in 
exclusion rates, they conclude again that “there is no compelling evidence that high-stakes testing 
policies have improved the performance of students on the grade 8 NAEP math tests” (p. 43). 
 
Reanalysis 
Our approach to the question differs in a number of ways from Amrein and Berliner (2002a): 
1) In addition to carrying out an analysis for the eighteen high-stakes states that were the 
focus of Amrein and Berliner (2002a), we carry out a parallel analysis for the other 32 
states. 
2) We augment our analysis by including a more comprehensive measure of states’ 
educational reform efforts.  
3) Our interpretation of the State Gain statistics is informed by consideration of the 
corresponding estimated standard errors. (Since the State Gain is a “difference of 
differences,” these standard errors are not negligible, with a typical value of 2.5 points on 
the NAEP scale.) 
4) In the analysis of the grade 8 data, we look at changes over the period 1992 to 2000, 
rather than 1990 to 2000. Our choice makes the analyses for grades 4 and 8 more 
comparable, and provides slightly more data.  
 
The data were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics Web site (2003). 
The data extracted comprise grade 4 and grade 8 NAEP mathematics results in the years 1992 
and 2000 for the states and the nation (public schools only). For each jurisdiction, grade and 
year, we recorded the average score, the corresponding estimated standard error, and the percent 
of students excluded. The data are displayed in Table A1 of the appendix. We note that relevant 
NAEP data is available for 15 of 18 high-stakes states and 18 of 32 of the other or “low-stakes” 
states. 
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For each state and grade, we compute the State Gain and its estimated standard error. 
Specifically, let  
 
d4 (state) = [state(’00) – state(’92)] – [nat’l(’00) – nat’l(’92)] 
 
where the quantities on the right hand side of the equation represent the average results for grade 4. 
Further, for each state let  
 
s.e.(d4) = (estimated) standard error of d4. 
 
Since the four quantities contributing to d4 are derived from independent samples, s.e.(d4) 
is simply the square root of the sum of the (estimated) variances of the four quantities. We also 
compute, for each grade and state, the changes in the percent of excluded students over the 
period, denoted c%ex. 
Now let  
 
 D4 = d4 / s.e (d4) 
 
and 
 
 
4
4
4
4
4
2,  if 1
1,  if 1 0
1,  if 0 1
2,  if 1
D
D
V
D
D
≥⎧⎪ > ≥⎪= ⎨− > > −⎪⎪− − ≥⎩
 
 
with a parallel set of definitions for d8, D8, and V8 for the grade 8 results. Finally, we let  
 
 V = V4 + V8. 
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Table 1 
Basic Results for Analysis of NAEP Mathematics Scores: Grades 4 and 8 Trends for 1992 to 
2000 
State Policy score 4d  
s.e. 
( 4d ) 4
D  4V  
Changes 
in % 
excluded 
Gr. 4 
8d  
s.e. 
( 8d ) 8
D  8V  
Changes 
in % 
excluded 
Gr. 8 
V  
AL 2.20 1.96 2.45 0.80 1 1.27 2.42 2.75 0.88 1 -0.51 2 
GA 0.66 -3.69 2.05 -1.80 -2 1.28 -0.57 2.13 -0.27 -1 2.52 -3 
IN 0.90 5.73 1.95 2.94 2 3.46 5.41 2.24 2.41 2 2.72 4 
LA -0.03 6.17 2.38 2.59 2 3.68 1.45 2.57 0.56 1 1.49 3 
MD 2.46 -2.66 2.20 -1.21 -2 4.88 3.64 2.30 1.58 2 5.88 0 
MN -0.40 -0.88 2.04 -0.43 -1 2.44 -2.29 2.15 -1.06 -2 2.03 -3 
MS 0.55 1.49 1.97 0.76 1 -0.59 0.03 2.17 0.01 1 0.30 2 
NM 0.78 -7.09 2.42 -2.93 -2 4.95 -7.31 2.33 -3.13 -2 6.21 -4 
NY 0.09 0.46 2.21 0.21 1 6.24 2.29 3.21 0.71 1 4.64 2 
NC 1.60 11.92 1.94 6.14 2 9.48 14.18 2.07 6.86 2 10.59 4 
OH 1.15 4.21 2.17 1.94 2 3.91 7.00 2.47 2.83 2 2.61 4 
SC 0.90 0.27 2.16 0.12 1 2.65 -1.96 2.12 -0.93 -1 0.94 0 
TN 0.32 1.23 2.37 0.52 1 -0.10 -2.94 2.55 -1.15 -2 -0.33 -1 
TX -0.66 7.09 2.12 3.34 2 7.86 2.71 2.34 1.16 2 2.99 4 
Hi-
stakes 
states 
VA 0.55 1.98 2.21 0.89 1 5.55 1.27 2.29 0.55 1 4.69 2 
AZ -0.40 -4.14 2.17 -1.91 -2 6.92 -2.20 2.36 -0.93 -1 3.37 -3 
AR -0.27 -0.80 1.91 -0.42 -1 1.15 -2.49 2.21 -1.13 -2 1.94 -3 
CA 0.09 -2.49 2.72 -0.91 -1 -3.24 -6.27 2.92 -2.14 -2 0.42 -3 
CT 1.29 -0.21 2.05 -0.10 -1 3.37 0.62 2.19 0.28 1 3.60 0 
HI 0.32 -5.86 2.14 -2.73 -2 4.42 -2.18 2.04 -1.07 -2 2.42 -4 
ID -0.27 -2.32 1.99 -1.17 -2 2.46 -4.72 1.97 -2.39 -2 1.59 -4 
KY 1.97 -1.71 1.99 -0.86 -1 4.95 1.77 2.20 0.81 1 4.91 0 
ME 1.29 -8.73 1.85 -4.72 -2 4.46 -2.54 2.00 -1.27 -2 4.13 -4 
MA 0.32 0.71 2.05 0.34 1 3.45 2.79 2.07 1.35 2 3.99 3 
MI 0.43 3.35 2.56 1.31 2 3.11 3.55 2.47 1.44 2 0.48 4 
MO 1.02 -1.32 2.10 -0.63 -1 5.34 -5.10 2.28 -2.24 -2 4.11 -3 
NE -1.61 -7.04 2.46 -2.87 -2 3.45 -4.58 2.02 -2.26 -2 -0.57 -4 
ND -0.03 -5.42 1.71 -3.18 -2 3.98 -7.69 2.02 -3.81 -2 1.40 -4 
OK 0.43 -2.93 2.03 -1.45 -2 3.18 -4.03 2.27 -1.78 -2 2.31 -4 
RI 0.09 1.53 2.32 0.66 1 5.89 -0.03 1.84 -0.01 -1 6.67 0 
UT 1.15 -4.40 2.00 -2.20 -2 2.63 -6.45 1.87 -3.45 -2 1.45 -4 
WV 0.90 1.92 2.03 0.95 1 5.65 4.15 1.91 2.17 2 5.29 3 
Lo-
stakes 
states 
WY -0.95 -3.78 2.03 -1.86 -2 2.55 -5.94 1.93 -3.07 -2 0.01 -4 
 
 
Table 1 displays the relevant quantities. (Note: The policy score will be defined 
presently.) We observe that for high-stakes states, d4 ranges from –7.09 to 11.92, with a median 
of 1.49 and a mean of 1.88; d8 ranges from –7.31 to 14.18, with a median of 1.45 and a mean of 
1.69. For low-stakes states, d4 ranges from –8.73 to 3.35, with a median of –2.41 and a mean of  
–2.42; d8 ranges from –7.69 to 4.15, with a median of 2.52−  and a mean of –2.30. Thus, we see 
that the typical State Gain for high-stakes states is substantially larger than the typical State Gain 
for low-stakes states in both grades 4 and 8. 
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At grade 4, the difference in means between the high-stakes and low-stakes states is  
4.3 score points and at grade 8 it is 3.99 score points. Note that in computing the difference in 
means, the gain of the nation over the period 1992 to 2000 is eliminated. Consequently, such 
differences provide a direct comparison between the typical gains for high-stakes states and low-
stakes states. Some might prefer such comparisons because the results for the nation are 
influenced by all the states we are considering, as well as the states that did not participate in 
both NAEP administrations. However, we have chosen to follow the approach of Amrein and 
Berliner (2002a) in order to facilitate comparisons between our results and theirs. 
While there certainly is interest in the State Gains (ds) themselves, we believe there is 
also value in comparing states in terms of the Vs, which are essentially discretized effect sizes. 
Specifically, Vk (k = 4 or 8) gives a state 2 “credits” if dk exceeds one standard error (in one 
direction or the other). While the usual criterion for statistical significance (which is not 
particularly appropriate in this setting) would require exceeding two standard errors, there is 
practical interest in identifying states whose relative gain is at least greater than one standard 
error—given the magnitude of the standard errors, the level of dispersion in the dks among the 
states, and the fact that the national gain (although statistically independent of the state gains) is 
influenced by the educational policies of the various states. 
A state that presents what one might term a strongly consistent picture of relative 
improvement over the nation (i.e., D4 > 1 and D8 > 1) is awarded 4 credits. One that presents a 
moderately consistent picture (e.g., D4  > 1 and 1 > D8 >0) is awarded 3 credits and one that 
presents a mildly consistent picture (i.e., 1 > D4 > 0 and 1 > D8 > 0) is awarded 2 credits. Note 
that this coding scheme limits the influence of outliers and allows us to distinguish most 
configurations of D4 and D8.  
The distributions of V for the high-stakes testing states and the remaining states are 
presented in Table 2. For the first group, we have values of V for 15 out of the 18 states, while 
for the second group we have values of V for 18 out of 32 states. There is a striking difference 
between the two groups of states: High-stakes states are more likely to show strongly consistent 
improvement relative to the nation (V = 4) than low-stakes states (4/15 vs. 1/18) and much less 
likely to show strongly consistent lack of improvement (V = –4) relative to the nation (1/15 vs. 
8/18). The story remains qualitatively the same if we compare the groups with less stringent cut-offs.  
 
Table 2 
Distribution of V for Hi-stakes and Lo-stakes States 
# Lo-stakes 
states 
Total = 18 
V 
# Hi-stakes 
states 
Total = 15 
1 4 4 
2 3 1 
0 2 4 
0 1 0 
3 0 2 
0 -1 1 
0 -2 0 
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4 -3 2 
8 -4 1 
 
In summary, high-stakes testing states that participated in the NAEP mathematics 
assessment in both 1992 and 2000 typically showed improvement relative to the nation while 
low-stakes testing states that participated in the NAEP mathematics assessment in both 1992 and 
2000 typically showed lack of improvement relative to the nation. (We must be careful to 
condition on participation in NAEP since a large number of low-stakes states did not participate 
in NAEP in one or both of the years under study.) The question is how to interpret the 
comparison. 
With respect to the results for the high-stakes states, Amrein and Berliner (2002a) 
discount the finding, in part, because of the empirical association between State Gain and the 
change in percent excluded. This is a reasonable argument but one that deserves further scrutiny 
for at least two reasons. First, the observed correlation may be unduly influenced by an outlying 
observation and, second, there are other, observable and unobservable characteristics of states 
that may also account for some of the differences among states. (It also should be noted that the 
1992 exclusion rates are not strictly comparable to those in 1996 and 2000. The former were 
calculated as an average over mathematics and reading, while the latter two are reported for 
mathematics only.) 
 
North Carolina
Texas
-12
-6
0
6
12
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Change in % Excluded (1992 to 2000)
d
4 Hi-Stakes States
Lo-Stakes States
 
Figure 1a. Grade 4: 4d  vs. Change in % Excluded (1992 to 2000). 
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Figure 1b. Grade 8: 8d  vs. Change in % Excluded (1992 to 2000). 
Figure 1a displays a plot of 4d  against c%ex and Figure 1b displays a plot of d8 against 
c%ex. North Carolina is a clear outlier on both plots, while Texas is an outlier in Figure 1a. 
Table 3 presents the correlations for the two groups of states, including the case for the high-
stakes states with North Carolina removed. In the fourth grade, we see that the correlation for the 
high-stakes states is indeed substantial, but markedly reduced when North Carolina is deleted. 
For the eighth grade, the reduction is even more dramatic. On the other hand, for low stakes 
states in the eighth grade, the correlation is quite high. One might, therefore, plausibly argue that 
the results for the low-stakes states would be further depressed (relative to those for the high-
stakes states) if their apparent relationship to c%ex were somehow taken into account. 
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Table 3 
Correlations Between State Gains and Change in % Excluded for Years 1992 to 2000 
 State gains 
 Grade 4 ( 4d ) Grade 8 ( 8d ) 
Hi-stakes (# = 15) 0.44 0.49 
Hi-stakes w/o NC (# = 14) 0.17 -0.01 
Lo-stakes (# = 18) 0.02 0.55 
 
It is often the case that gain scores are negatively correlated with the base year score. 
Accordingly, in Figures 2a and 2b we plot d4 against the grade 4 state score (’92) and d8 against 
the grade 8 state score (’92). In both cases, we observe the expected negative correlations. Plots 
of d4 and d8 against their standard errors were not informative and are not presented. 
-12
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12
200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235
State Scale Score (1992)
d
4 Hi-Stakes States
Lo-Stakes States
 
Figure 2a. Grade 4: 4d  vs. State Scale Score (1992). 
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Figure 2b. Grade 8: 8d  vs. State Scale Score (1992). 
As was noted in the Introduction, changes in state NAEP scores over time can be the 
result of many factors in addition to percent of students excluded and testing policies. In 
particular, other educational interventions that have been adopted by the state with the intention 
of raising the academic achievement of its students may well have their intended effect, at least 
to some degree. It would be helpful, therefore, to have a broader measure of each state’s 
educational policy efforts to incorporate into an explanatory framework. Fortunately, one such a 
measure has been formulated and quantified as part of a study of the influence of standards-
based reform on changes in classroom practice (Swanson & Stevenson, 2002). 
Drawing on studies conducted by the Council of Chief State School Officers, Swanson 
and Stevenson graded each state on each of 22 policy activities organized into four categories: 
content standards, performance standards, aligned assessments and professional standards. 
Grades were assigned on a three point scale: does not have such a policy (0), is developing one 
(1), or has enacted such a policy as of 1996 (2). They then carried out a Rasch analysis using this 
50 x 22 data array, yielding a “state (policy) activism score” for each state. They report a low 
level of item misfit. For more details, consult their article.  
In view of the comprehensiveness of the policy information employed and that 1996 falls 
in the middle of the period of interest, we propose to use the policy activism scale as another 
possible explanatory variable in our effort to account for differences among states in State Gains. 
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The policy activism scores are located in the second column of Table 1. Figures 3a and 3b 
display plots of d4 and d8 against activism scores.  
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Figure 3a. Grade 4: 4d  vs. Policy Score. 
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Figure 3b. Grade 8: 8d  vs. Policy Score. 
Since the mean policy score over the 50 states is 0.28, we note that the 33 states that we 
are examining tend to have scores above the mean. The median for the high-stakes states is 0.66 
and the median for the low-stakes states is 0.32. Correlations between State Gain and policy 
scores for the two groups of states are presented in Table 4. We observe the relationship is 
moderately strong and positive in grade 8, but rather mixed in grade 4. Again, North Carolina 
exerts considerable leverage on the results for the high-stakes states. 
Table 4  
Correlations Between State Gains for Years 1992 to 2000 and Policy Score 
 State gains 
 Grade 4 ( 4d ) Grade 8 ( 8d ) 
Hi-stakes (# = 15) -0.07 0.37 
Hi-stakes w/o NC (# = 14) -0.29 0.26 
Lo-stakes (# = 18) 0.22 0.38 
 
Before proceeding to the next stage of the comparison between the high-stakes and low-
stakes states, it might be of interest to compare the V distributions of high activism and low 
activism states, defined by whether they are above or below the mean policy score of 0.28, 
Education Policy Analysis Archives 
Volume 12 Number 1  |  January 5, 2004  |  ISSN 1068-2341 
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n1/ 
Braun: Re-considering the Impact of High-stakes Testing 
Page 14 of 43 
 
14 
respectively. The results are presented in Table 5, which is analogous to Table 2. This 
comparison involves 21 out 27 high activism states and 12 out of 23 low activism states. While 
the comparison favors the high activism states, it is less clear-cut than the one in Table 2. Note 
that the V values of the high activism states fall about equally above and below zero. On the 
other hand, the V values of the low activism states are more likely to be negative. Thus, 
somewhat surprisingly, the categorization employed in Amrein and Berliner (2002a) seems to 
provide a sharper contrast than the categorization based on the broader policy analysis employed 
by Swanson and Stevenson (2002). 
Table 5 
Distribution of V for Hi-policy Score and Lo-policy Score States 
# Lo-policy score 
states 
Total = 12 
V 
# Hi-policy score 
states 
Total = 21 
1 4 4 
1 3 2 
1 2 3 
0 1 0 
1 0 4 
0 -1 1 
0 -2 0 
4 -3 2 
4 -4 5 
 
 
Returning to the main thread of our reanalysis, we carry out a multiple regression of d4 on 
three explanatory variables: state score (’92), c%ex and activism score, and an analogous 
regression for d8. In both regressions, we leave out North Carolina and Texas because they are 
outliers in one or both panels of Figure 1. The essential elements of the regression output are 
presented in Tables 6a and 6b. 
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Table 6a  
Grade 4: Regression of 4d  on Policy Score, 1992 State Scale Score, Change in % Excluded for Years 1992 to 2000 
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 67.1 22.4 1.7 0.2 
Residual 27 350.3 13.0   
Total 30 417.4    
      
 Coefficients Standard error t stat P-value  
Intercept 40.6 20.9 1.9 0.1  
Policy score 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5  
Score -0.2 0.1 -2.0 0.1  
Change in % 
excluded 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8  
      
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
     
Regression statistics      
Multiple R 0.40     
R square 0.16     
Adjusted R square 0.07     
Standard error 3.60     
Observations 31.00     
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Table 6b  
Grade 8: Regression of 8d  on Policy Score, 1992 State Scale Score, Change in % Excluded for Years 1992 to 2000 
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression  3 113.3 37.8 2.9 0.1 
Residual 27 353.8 13.1   
Total 30 467.2    
      
 Coefficients Standard error t stat P-value  
Intercept 21.3   20.2 1.1 0.3  
Policy score 1.5 0.9 1.7 0.1  
Score -0.1  0.1 -1.2  0.2  
Change in % 
excluded 
0.3 0.3 0.9 0.4  
      
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
     
Regression statistics      
Multiple R 0.49     
R square 0.24     
Adjusted R square 0.16     
Standard error 3.62     
Observations 31.00     
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  For Grade 4, the R2 = 0.16 (adjusted R2 = 0.07) so clearly the three explanatory variables 
do not account for very much of between-state variation; only state score (’92) is marginally 
significant. Overall, residual plots against each of the explanatory variables do not reveal any 
patterns. However, the residuals for the 13 high-stakes states (i.e. not including Texas and North 
Carolina) tend be more positive than the residuals for the 18 low-stakes states. This is to be 
expected given the results in Tables 1, 2 and 6. 
Figure 4a presents the residual plot against c%ex. The residuals for Texas and North 
Carolina were obtained by substituting their values for the three explanatory variables into the 
regression equation presented in Table 6a (which was estimated using the other 31 states). We 
note that Texas and North Carolina are outliers in the sense that they have both the largest values 
on c%ex and the largest positive residuals. On the other hand, for the other states there appears to 
be no association (linear or otherwise) between c%ex and state gain. 
Grade 4: Change in % Excluded Residual Plot (1992 to 2000)
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Figure 4a. Grade 4: Plot of residuals vs. Change in % Excluded (1992 to 2000). Residuals 
obtained from a regression of 4d on state score ('92), c%ex and policy score. 
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Grade 8: Change in % Excluded Residual Plot (1992 to 2000)
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Figure 4b. Grade 8: Plot of residuals vs. Change in % Excluded (1992 to 2000). Residuals 
obtained from a regression of 8d  on state score ('92), c%ex and policy score. 
Turning to Grade 8 (Table 6b), we note that the R2 = 0.24 (adjusted R2 = 0.16) and that 
the only explanatory variable that approaches significance is policy score. Overall, the residual 
plots again reveal no interesting patterns, except that high-stakes states tend to have more 
positive residuals than do low-stakes states. Figure 4b presents the residual plot against c%ex, 
with the residuals for Texas and North Carolina added. North Carolina remains an outlier, but 
not Texas. For the other states, there does not appear to be an association between c%ex and 
state gain.  
In view of the above analysis, it is not appropriate to discount the differences in results 
between the high-stakes and low-stakes states (e.g. Table 2) by arguing they are strongly 
influenced by differences in changes in percent of students excluded over the period 1992 to 
2000. That argument is simply not supported by the data.  
One might want to distinguish the results for North Carolina from those of the other 
states, arguing that the unusually large value of c%ex “explains” the unusually large value of 
State Gain. If that were the case, then school officials in North Carolina would have been much 
more adept than officials in other states in excluding SD/LEP students who would have done 
poorly on NAEP. In particular, school officials in New Mexico, which also experienced a large 
increase in percent of students excluded (particularly in Grade 8) but large negative State Gains, 
would have much to learn from their counterparts in North Carolina! A more circumspect 
statement about North Carolina is that its State Gain may well be a consequence of both its 
reform policies and the increase in excluded students—but that with the data available we are 
neither able to determine the relative contributions of these two factors nor those of other factors. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives 
Volume 12 Number 1  |  January 5, 2004  |  ISSN 1068-2341 
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n1/ 
Braun: Re-considering the Impact of High-stakes Testing 
Page 19 of 43 
 
19 
Cohort Analyses 
Amrein and Berliner (2002a) correctly point out that a weakness of the repeated cross-
sectional studies described above is that real changes over time in student test performance are 
confounded with changes in the characteristics of successive cohorts that are unrelated to school 
effects but associated with performance. For example, in a particular state, grade 4 students in 
2000 might be more disadvantaged than were grade 4 students in 1992 and, therefore, perform 
more poorly on NAEP even if the productivity of the state’s schools remained unchanged. 
The structure of the NAEP system makes possible another way of looking at a state’s 
performance. Since NAEP tested students in mathematics in both grades 4 and 8 every four 
years, we can determine the gains of the cohort tested in grade 4 in 1992 and again in grade 8 in 
1996, as well as the gains of the cohort tested in grade 4 in 1996 and again in grade 8 in 2000. 
Although the actual students tested four years apart are not the same students (i.e., this is not a 
true longitudinal study like High School and Beyond), each group is a probability sample of their 
respective cohorts. Thus, the observed gain is an approximately unbiased estimate of the 
population gain over the period in question. The word “approximately” is appropriate since there 
are inflows and outflows over the four years, as well as differential rates of exclusions and non-
response at school and student levels. Nonetheless, the results should be sufficiently accurate for 
our purposes. 
Others have also studied cohort gains and obtained results that cast a different light on 
between state comparisons. Examining data for 1992 and 1996, Barton and Coley (1998) 
concluded that “Most of the states are not significantly different from each other in terms of 
cohort growth from the fourth to the eighth grade.” They point out, for example, Maine ranks 
near the top for grade 4 in 1992 and for grade 8 in 1996, while Arkansas ranks near the bottom in 
both years. Nevertheless, both cohorts gained 52 points over the four-year period. 
We now carry out an analysis that parallels the one described in the previous section. The 
data extracted from the NCES Web site comprise grade 4 NAEP mathematics results for 1992 
and 1996 and grade 8 NAEP mathematics results for 1996 and 2000, for the states and the nation 
(public schools only). For each jurisdiction, for the indicated grade and year, we recorded the 
average score, the corresponding estimated standard error, and the percent of students excluded. 
The data are displayed in Table A2 of the appendix. 
For each state and grade, we compute the State Cohort Gain (1992 to 1996) as 
 
g1 = [state(grade 8, 1996) – state(grade 4, 1992)] – [national (grade 8, 1996)  
        – national (grade 4, 1992)] 
 
where the quantities on the right hand side of the equation represent the average results for the 
indicated grade and year. Further, for each state let 
 
 s.e. (g1) = (estimated) standard error of g1. 
 
As before, since the four quantities contributing to g1 are derived from independent samples, 
s.e. 1( )g  is the square root of the sum of their (estimated) variances. We also computed the 
changes from 1992 to 1996 in the percent of excluded students in the cohort. Now let 
 
 G1 = g1 / s.e. (g1) 
and 
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There is a set of analogous definitions for g2, G2, and W2 based on the cohort gains from grade 4 
in 1996 to grade 8 in 2000. Finally, we let 
 
 1 2.W W W= +   
Table 7 displays the relevant quantities. For high-stakes states, g1 ranges from –5.06 to 3.63, with 
a median of –1.98 and a mean of -1.18. For low-stakes states, g1 ranges from –3.86 to 5.51, with 
a median of 0.75 and a mean of 0.68. Turning to the second cohort, for high-stakes states, g2 
ranges from –7.81 to 3.73, with a median of –1.20 and a mean of –1.08. For low-stakes states, g2 
ranges from –6.56 to 7.00, with a median of 0.12 and a mean of 0.06. 
Thus, the difference in means for the earlier cohort between high-stakes and low-stakes 
states is 1.86−  and for the later cohort the difference is –1.14. As before, the growth of the 
nation over the relevant four-year period is eliminated when we consider these differences in 
means. Interestingly, the results for low-stakes states are now somewhat better than those for 
high-stakes states—a reversal of what we found when we looked at change over time in a 
particular grade. 
Note also that W1 and W2 are based on independent samples, so that W (when it is 
defined) is a reasonable choice as a summary measure of the state’s relative performance over 
the period 1992 to 2000. On the other hand, there is value in studying W1 and W2 separately, to 
see if there are any trends over time and to examine patterns of association with c%ex and policy 
score. 
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Table 7 
Basic Results for Cohort Analysis of NAEP Mathematics Scores 
  Chohort 1992 to 1996 Cohort 1996 to 2000  
State Policy score 1g  s.e. ( 1g ) 1G  1W  
Changes in % 
excluded 2g  s.e. ( 2g ) 2G  2W  
Changes in % 
excluded W  
AL 2.20 -3.66 3.03 -1.21 -2 2.64 -1.56 2.54 -0.62 -1 -1.34 -3 
FL -0.27 -1.98 2.78 -0.71 -1 1.56 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
GA 0.66 -5.06 2.52 -2.01 -2 1.76 -1.20 2.36 -0.51 -1 -0.03 -3 
IN 0.90 2.56 2.29 1.12 2 2.29 1.58 2.23 0.71 1 2.02 3 
LA -0.03 -3.69 2.59 -1.42 -2 1.96 -2.11 2.29 -0.92 -1 -1.90 -3 
MD 2.46 0.43 2.88 0.15 1 2.62 3.25 2.50 1.30 2 2.88 3 
MN -0.40 3.63 2.17 1.67 2 -0.40 3.39 2.24 1.51 2 -0.63 4 
MS 0.55 -3.54 2.17 -1.64 -2 1.87 -6.47 2.22 -2.91 -2 1.50 -4 
NV 0.32 *** *** *** *** ***  -1.51 2.08 -0.73 -1 1.27 *** 
NM 0.78 -3.26 2.38 -1.37 -2 0.45 -6.07 2.80 -2.17 -2 -0.39 -4 
NY 0.09 -0.14 2.54 -0.06 -1 2.34 1.56 2.77 0.56 1 5.33 0 
NC 1.60 3.02 2.31 1.31 2 0.59 3.73 2.11 1.77 2 6.96 4 
SC 0.90 -3.65 2.38 -1.54 -2 0.98 1.09 2.32 0.47 1 1.20 -1 
TN 0.32 0.24 2.43 0.10 1 0.46 -7.81 2.58 -3.02 -2 -1.84 -1 
TX -0.66 0.35 2.37 0.15 1 1.06 -5.94 2.41 -2.47 -2 -0.75 -1 
Hi-stakes  
states 
VA 0.55 -2.94 2.50 -1.18 -2 2.02 1.96 2.42 0.81 1 3.29 -1 
AZ -0.40 0.69 2.38 0.29 1 3.59 1.07 2.66 0.40 1 -3.34 2 
AR -0.27 -0.48 2.28 -0.21 -1 1.58 -6.56 2.40 -2.73 -2 1.49 -3 
CA 0.09 2.44 2.82 0.87 1 -2.21 0.97 3.05 0.32 1 -7.07 2 
CO 0.66 2.66 2.06 1.29 2 -0.83 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
CT 1.29 0.86 2.15 0.40 1 1.70 -2.20 2.20 -1.00 -1 2.10 0 
DE 0.21 -3.10 1.90 -1.63 -2 3.34 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
HI 0.32 -3.86 2.18 -1.77 -2 -0.54 -4.27 2.38 -1.79 -2 1.50 -4 
IA -1.61 2.17 2.20 0.99 1 1.97 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
KY 1.97 -0.39 2.06 -0.19 -1 1.40 -0.50 2.21 -0.23 -1 3.75 -2 
ME 1.29 0.49 2.18 0.23 1 -0.95 -0.64 2.06 -0.31 -1 1.04 0 
MA 0.32 -0.96 2.55 -0.38 -1 1.03 2.08 2.27 0.92 1 3.11 0 
MI 0.43 5.06 2.87 1.76 2 -0.14 0.12 2.44 0.05 1 0.37 3 
MO 1.02 -0.86 2.33 -0.37 -1 2.73 -3.23 2.24 -1.44 -2 3.64 -3 
MT -1.26 *** ***  *** *** ***  7.00 2.18 3.20 2 0.67 *** 
NE -1.61 5.51 2.16 2.55 2 0.20 1.00 2.10 0.48 1 -1.52 3 
ND -0.03 3.63 1.88 1.93 2 1.58 0.10 2.10 0.05 1 0.24 3 
OR 0.66 *** ***  *** *** ***  5.09 2.51 2.03 2 -2.58 *** 
RI 0.09 1.50 2.30 0.65 1 1.37 0.94 2.22 0.42 1 5.61 2 
UT 1.15 0.80 2.02 0.40 1 2.03 -3.15 2.10 -1.50 -2 0.03 -1 
VT -0.27 *** ***  *** *** ***  6.45 2.11 3.06 2 3.46 *** 
Lo-stakes  
states 
WV 0.90 -2.33 2.06 -1.13 -2 4.07 -4.64 1.95 -2.39 -2 2.74 -4 
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WI -0.40 2.23 2.37 0.94 1 1.99 *** *** *** *** *** ***  
WY -0.95 -2.53 1.95 -1.30 -2 -1.73 1.42 2.25 0.63 1 -0.18 -1 
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We begin by considering State Cohort Gains for the period 1992 to 1996. We note that the 15 
high-stakes states with relevant data are not identical to the 15 high-stakes states in the previous 
section. Here, we have lost Ohio but gained Florida. We also now have data on 20 low-stakes 
states, rather than 18 earlier. We have lost Idaho and Oklahoma but gained Colorado, Delaware, 
Iowa, and Wisconsin. (Note: These “gains” and “losses” are entirely determined by  
the pattern of the states’ participation in the NAEP assessments of 1992, 1996 and 2000.) 
Table 8a 
Distribution of 1W  for Hi-stakes and Lo-stakes States 
# Lo-stakes states W1 # Hi-stakes states 
4 
8 
4 
4 
2 
1 
-1 
-2 
3 
3 
2 
7 
 
Table 8b 
Distribution of 2W  for Hi-stakes and Lo-stakes States 
# Lo-stakes states W2 # Hi-stakes states 
3 
8 
3 
5 
2 
1 
-1 
-2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
 
Table 8c 
Distribution of W for Hi-stakes and Lo-stakes States 
# Lo-stakes states W # Hi-stakes states 
0 
3 
3 
0 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
3 
2 
 
 
The distribution of W1 for the high-stakes and low-stakes states is presented in Table 8a. 
The results for low-stakes states are somewhat better than those for high-stakes states. In 
particular, nearly half (7/15) of the latter experienced substantial negative gains (W1 = -2). To 
develop further insight, we plot g1 against c%ex (Figure 5) and against policy score (Figure 6). 
Neither plot contains any obvious outliers. 
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Figure 5. 1g  vs. Change in % excluded [Grade 4 (1992) to Grade 8 (1996)]. 
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Figure 6. 1g  vs. Policy Score. 
Figure 5 suggests an overall negative association with c%ex and this is borne out by the 
correlations calculated separately for the two groups of states. (See Table 9.) Figure 6 also 
suggests an overall negative association with policy score and, again, this is borne out by the 
correlations for the two groups of states. (See Table 9.) Given the magnitude of the correlations, 
as well as the distributions of the two groups of states on the predictors, there does not appear to 
be an obvious “explanation” for the observed differences in results between the high-stakes and 
low-stakes states. 
Table 9 
Correlations Between State Gains for 1992 Grade 4 to 1996 Grade 8 and Change in % 
Excluded and Policy Score  
 Hi-stakes states Lo-stakes states 
Change in % excluded -0.36 -0.22 
Policy score -0.06 -0.28 
 
Next we consider State Cohort Gains for the period 1996 to 2000. We note that again 
there are 15 high-stakes states with relevant data. In comparison to the previous section, we have 
lost Ohio but gained Nevada. We also now have data on 19 low-stakes states (rather than 18 
earlier). We have lost Idaho and Oklahoma but gained Montana, Oregon, and Vermont. 
The distribution of W2 for high-stakes and low-stakes states is presented in Table 8b. The 
results for the low-stakes states are just slightly more positive than those for the high-stakes 
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states. As before, we plot g2 against c%ex (Figure 7) and against policy score (Figure 8). The 
plots for the later cohort are markedly different from those for the earlier cohort.  
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Figure 7. 2g  vs. Change in % Excluded [Grade 4 (1996) to Grade 8 (2000)]. 
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Figure 8. 2g  vs. Policy Score. 
 
In Figure 7, there is no clear overall pattern. When we calculate the correlations (see 
Table 10), we see a strong positive relationship for the high-stakes states and a weak negative 
relationship for the low-stakes states. Turning to Figure 8, we again see no strong overall pattern. 
However, the correlation with policy score is quite positive for the high-stakes states and quite 
negative for the low-stakes states (see Table 10). 
Table 10 
Correlations Between State Gains for 1996 Grade 4 to 2000 Grade 8 and Change in % 
Excluded and Policy Score  
 Hi-stakes states Lo-stakes states 
Change in % excluded 0.61 -0.18 
Policy score 0.33 -0.42 
 
What are we to make of these results? With respect to the policy score, we would expect 
to see a stronger relationship to the gains for the later cohort, since the policy score is based on a 
review of state policies in 1996, the base year for the later cohort data. This is the case for the 
high-stakes states but not the low-stakes states. Indeed, the difference in the signs of the 
correlations for the two groups of states is puzzling and indicates some possible deficiencies in 
the formulation of the policy score. Specifically, the policy score does not have a strong 
accountability component. 
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The correlation of 0.61 in the second cohort between State Cohort Gain and change in 
percent excluded for high-stakes states is striking, and does not appear to be the result of a single 
outlier. This suggests that at least a portion of the gain in many of the high-stakes states may be 
attributable to increases in percent excluded. Making a regression adjustment (which implicitly 
maximizes the impact of the changes in percent excluded) would further increase the gap 
between high-stakes and low-stakes states, to the advantage of the latter. Finally, Table 8c, which 
displays the distribution of W for 14 high-stakes states and 16 low-stakes states with data for 
both cohorts, presents a decidedly mixed picture. Certainly, the lack of consistency in results 
between the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses bears further scrutiny. The two most 
obvious problems are that the sets of states being compared differ somewhat and the criteria 
employed differ in both the grades and cohorts involved.  
With regard to the first point, the exchanges of states between the two analyses appear to 
favor the low-stakes states rather than the high-stakes states. Consider, for example, the analysis 
of cohort gains for 1992 to 1996 (Table 8a). The high-stakes group lost Ohio, which was a high 
achieving state (V = 4) and gained Florida, which was a low achieving state (W1 = –1). On the 
other hand, the low-stakes group lost Idaho and Oklahoma, which were both low achieving states 
(V = –4 for both) and gained Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, and Wisconsin, which were mostly high 
achieving states ( W1 = 2, –2, 1,1, respectively). A similar situation pertains to the cohort gains 
for 1996 to 2000 (Table 8b). The high-stakes group lost Ohio (V = 4) and gained Nevada (W2 =  
–1). The low-stakes group lost Idaho and Oklahoma (V = –4 for both) and gained Montana, 
Oregon, and Vermont (W2 = 2 for all). 
Not surprisingly, if we examine the distributions of W1 and W2 for the same sets of high-
stakes and low-stakes states used in the cross-sectional analysis, we find the comparisons do not 
favor one group over the other. It is tempting to go further and impute the missing W1 and W2 
values (for the states in the cross-sectional analysis) based on their observed values of V. Were 
we to do so, we would find that the new distributions of W1 are essentially identical and that the 
new distributions of W2 slightly favor the high-stakes states. Such imputations, however, are 
themselves somewhat suspect since there is only a weak association between V and W1 or 
between V and W2. These findings are considered further in the Discussion. 
One Last Look 
Inasmuch as the intent of many reform efforts is to improve the achievement of low 
performing students, it seems worthwhile to investigate the patterns of relative improvement at a 
point other than the means of the score distributions. Accordingly, we selected the 25th percentile 
and carried through analyses that parallel those reported above. The basic data are presented in 
Table A3 of the appendix. 
First, for both grades 4 and 8, we compute the state gain at the 25th percentile compared 
to the nation, over the period 1992 to 2000. We normalize the state gains by dividing by the 
estimated standard errors. For grade 4, we denote the derived statistic by 4D′  and for grade 8 by 
8D′ . These statistics are plotted against D4 and D8, respectively, in Figures 9 and 10. As before, 
we distinguish high-stakes and low-stakes states and now fit separate least squares lines to the 
data in each figure. We can see that the comparisons between the two groups of states based on 
results at the 25th percentiles are very similar to those based on the means. 
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Figure 9. Grade 4: 4D′  vs. 4D . 
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Figure 10. Grade 8: 8D′  vs. 8D . 
 
Second, we carried out a cohort analysis using the 25th percentile. The basic data are 
presented in Table A4 of the appendix. We computed the state cohort gain (grade 4, 1992 to 
grade 8, 1996) at the 25th percentile compared to the nation. After dividing by the estimated 
standard error, we obtained a statistic, which we denote by 1G′ . For the state cohort gain (grade 4, 
1996 to grade 8, 2000), the corresponding statistic is denoted by 2G′ . These statistics are plotted 
against G1 and G2, respectively in Figures 11 and 12. Again, we distinguish high-stakes and low-
stakes states and fit separate least squares lines to the data in each figure. The figures indicate 
that the cohort results at the 25th percentile are similar to those at the mean. 
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Figure 11. 1G′  vs. 1G  [Grade 4 (1992) to Grade 8 (1996)]. 
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Figure 12. 2G′  vs. 2G  [Grade 4 (1996) to Grade 8 (2000)]. 
 
 
Discussion 
Our extended reanalysis of the NAEP component of Amrein and Berliner (2002a) began 
with a comparison of high-stakes and low-stakes states in terms of their relative gains over time 
at grades four and eight. These repeated cross-sectional contrasts strongly favor the high-stakes 
states, both when we look at the raw relative gains at the mean and when we consider the 
standard errors associated with those gains. The results cannot be accounted for by differences 
between the two groups in changes in percent excluded over that period or by the correlation 
between the relative gains and the change in percent excluded. There is some robustness to our 
findings inasmuch as the analyses at the 25th percentile produced similar results. Moreover, 
consideration of a state reform policy score due to Swanson and Stevenson also fails to account 
for differences in relative gains between states. Consequently, our conclusions differ from those 
in Amrein and Berliner (2002a).  
Other investigators have also taken issue with Amrein and Berliner. Carnoy and Loeb 
(2003), for example, adopt a somewhat different methodological approach. They focus on the 
period 1996 to 2000 and consider a number of different education outcomes. With respect to 
NAEP math scores, the criteria are the proportions of students, in grades 4 and 8, meeting the 
basic or proficient standards. They develop an accountability index, with each state assigned a 
score from 0 to 5 based on the estimated strength of its accountability efforts. (Note: This differs 
Education Policy Analysis Archives 
Volume 12 Number 1  |  January 5, 2004  |  ISSN 1068-2341 
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n1/ 
Braun: Re-considering the Impact of High-stakes Testing 
Page 33 of 43 
 
33 
from the policy score of Swanson and Stevenson, which is a broader measure of a state’s 
education reform efforts.) 
They do not divide the states into two groups; rather, they carry out a regression with the 
state as the unit of analysis. The criterion is the change in percent above the standard over the 
period 1996 to 2000 and the predictors are the accountability index for the state, as well as a 
number of other political, demographic and educational variables. The latter variables are 
selected on the basis of a preliminary regression in which the accountability index serves as the 
criterion and a large set of state characteristics are potential predictors. 
The rationale for this approach is quite sensible. To quote Carnoy and Loeb (p. 5): “… 
variables that could influence both the strength of accountability reforms and student outcomes 
are relevant.” That is, including such variables, along with the accountability index, in the main 
regression should reduce the misspecification bias and lead to more accurate estimates of the 
strength of association between the change in percent above the standard and the accountability 
index. Moreover, they estimate these regressions separately for White, Black, and Hispanic 
students. 
They find a relatively strong positive association between gains and the accountability 
index in grade 8, especially for Black and Hispanic students but a much weaker, though still 
positive, association in grade 4 (except for Black students, where the association is as strong as 
in grade 8). Consider, for example, the results for the 8th grade. On average, states that differ by 
two points on the accountability index (controlling for the other variables) exhibit non-trivial 
differences in gains (over the period 1996 to 2000) in the percentages of students achieving the 
basis skills level: For White students it is 2.8 percentage points; for Black students it is 5.1 
percentage points; for Hispanic students it is 8.9 percentage points. Actually, these findings are 
consistent with the results of Amrein and Berliner (2002a) for the period 1996 – 2000. The latter 
found a much stronger relationship between testing policy and relative score gains in the 8th 
grade than in the 4th grade. 
Since our analysis of relative gains at the mean focused on changes from 1992 to 2000, 
we replicated it for the period 1996 to 2000 to provide a more direct comparison to Carnoy and 
Loeb. We do not report the results here but note that we again observed a substantial advantage 
for high-stakes states, equally strong in both grades 4 and 8. When we plot the analogs of D4 and 
D8 against the policy score of Swanson and Stevenson, we find essentially no relationship in 
grade 4 and a moderately positive one in grade 8. 
Despite substantial methodological differences in the two approaches, the general tenor 
of the findings in Carnoy and Loeb with respect to NAEP results is consistent with ours: With 
the data available, there is no basis for rejecting the inference that the introduction of high-stakes 
testing for accountability is associated with gains in NAEP mathematics achievement through the 
1990s. Moreover, the strength of the association between states’ gains and a measure of the 
general accountability efforts in the states is greater in the 8th grade than in the 4th. 
In a subsequent paper, Amrein and Berliner (2002b), present an extensive compilation of 
the history of policy efforts in each state. Employing what they term an archival time series 
research design, Amrein and Berliner investigate the relationship between those efforts and 
subsequent relative gains (or losses) in NAEP achievement. In this context, as many as 28 states 
are identified as high-stakes testing states, where high-stakes is taken to mean that consequences 
have been attached to test results beyond those in place for many years.  
Their analysis, however, is undermined by a too-zealous use of changes in exclusion rates 
as a basis for eliminating states from consideration. For example, differential gains by North 
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Carolina are essentially dismissed because exclusion rates also increased over the period in 
question. This is done without regard to the relative (to other states) magnitudes of these 
changes. The number of states remaining is rather small and, thus, their conclusion that “…there 
is inadequate evidence to support the proposition that high-stakes tests and high school 
graduation exams increase student achievement” (p. 57) appears unwarranted. Raymond and 
Hanushek (2003) are very critical of Amrein and Berliner (2002b) on these and other grounds. 
Interested readers can find a related exchange of letters in the Fall 2003 issue of Education Next. 
(Note: After the original version of this report was prepared, the author learned of a paper 
by Rosenshine (2003). He also takes issue with the methodology of Amrein and Berliner (2000b) 
and carries out an alternative analysis comparing high-stakes and low-stakes states. For the 
period 1996 to 2000, he finds greater improvement for the high-stakes states in 4th grade and 8th 
grade mathematics. In response, Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner (2003) conducted a reanalysis, 
with similar conclusions. However, they discount the findings because of the tendency of high-
stakes states to have greater increases in the percent of students excluded from the NAEP 
assessments.) 
As we acknowledged at the outset, conclusions from analyses concerning the effects of 
testing or, more generally, accountability policies must be tentative, based as they are on highly 
aggregated, observational data. This caution proves well founded for the picture is somewhat 
different when we turn from cross-sectional analyses to pseudo-longitudinal studies, which 
involve following two different cohorts from grade 4 to grade 8. For both cohorts, the 
comparisons of relative gains slightly favor low-stakes states. Moreover, only part of the shift in 
favor of low-stakes states can be explained by the changes in the sets of states contributing to the 
different analyses. We also note that for the later cohort, there is a strong positive correlation 
between relative gains and change in percent excluded for the high-stakes states but a strong 
negative correlation for the low-stakes states. Our analysis of the cohort data leads to a 
conclusion (again tentative) that is consistent with that of Amrein and Berliner (2002a).  
Raymond and Hanushek (2003) also carry out a cohort analysis, but find a slight 
advantage in favor of states with higher stakes attached to test results. How can we explain these 
differences? First, with regard to the cohort analyses, Raymond and Hanushek are neither 
explicit about the criteria they employ to categorize states nor do they present the numbers of 
states in each category. It is likely that their three categories do not mesh cleanly with the two 
sets of 18 and 32 states that were the basis our cohort analysis. Equally important, Raymond and 
Hanushek indicate that they adjusted their results “…to account for changes in state spending on 
education and for parents’ education levels…” (p. 54). They do not describe the impact of these 
adjustments on the results. 
Presumably, these differences in findings for the cohorts can be explained once the 
categorization of states and the factors used in adjustment are elucidated. It is not obvious, 
however, how the adjusted results should be interpreted when viewed in the context of the 
changes in exclusion rates observed for each category of states. We must also remember that test 
scores are only one aspect of an educational system’s output and that other measures should be 
accorded comparable attention. 
The apparent inconsistency between the cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches is a 
signal for the larger question of which is to be preferred for policy purposes. The former is more 
common and is the basis of the adequate yearly progress provisions of NCLB. The latter is more 
appealing (at least to some) in that it avoids certain confounds and appears to be a fairer and 
more meaningful measure of the contribution of the system to student achievement. It also is 
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gaining popularity among state education departments. If one accepts cross-sectional analyses as 
the coin of the realm, then it appears that high-stakes testing is strongly associated with larger 
gains over the period 1992 to 2000. Those who believe that this does not imply a causal link 
must offer (perhaps) a different criterion, an alternative categorization of states, additional 
explanatory factors, a new methodology—or some combination of the foregoing. Apparently, 
this has not been done.  
Of course, there are other approaches. For example, one could try to show that the costs 
and consequences related to high-stakes testing (expenditures, student dropouts, teacher attrition, 
etc.) are not worth the score gains, particularly if those gains are not strongly tied to valued 
learning goals. Carrying out such a cost- benefit analysis would be a challenging path to take 
(Levin & McEwan, 2000). It would be worthwhile, however, as it might provide policymakers 
with a broader foundation for considering policy alternatives.  
On the other hand, if the logic of pseudo-longitudinal studies is more persuasive, then the 
argument in favor of high-stakes testing is more difficult to make and the burden of “proof” now 
falls on its proponents—who also have a variety of methodological options to choose from. In 
either case, as one reviewer has remarked, it is both disappointing and troubling that the 
trajectories at the 25th percentiles so closely track the trajectories at the mean. Many reform 
initiatives, most prominently Title I, have been directed at lower performing students – yet these 
students do not appear to have derived any special benefit. 
The general lack of strong associations across states between achievement gains and 
policy scores suggests that we have to be more diligent in documenting each state’s policy 
history as well as the trajectories through time of other relevant variables. Perhaps what is 
required is a multidimensional representation of the states’ education policies that takes explicit 
account of the time sequence of the various initiatives as well as the scope and quality of 
implementation. We would then have to appropriately incorporate that information into our 
analyses, exercising due respect for the limitations of both the design and the data.  
Nonetheless, no matter how careful and comprehensive we are, it is certain that the 
process of drawing defensible policy conclusions in this context will be fraught with difficulty 
and controversy. Even apparently sensible advice about educational reform (e.g. Barton, 2002) 
should be put to empirical test. However, given a limited observational database to work with, 
there are many policy indices and numerous ancillary variables that can be used in different ways 
to support or debunk the efficacy of high-stakes testing efforts or any other reform initiative. If 
we acknowledge that most states have embarked on a number of initiatives that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, overlap in time, then we must recognize that attributing observed differences in 
results to one of those initiatives is very problematic. 
In a similar vein, another reviewer pointed out, commenting on Table 8c for the cohort 
analysis, that states could have been classified according to whether or not they had been 
members of the Confederate States of America (CSA). Ninety percent of the CSA members had 
negative gains but only about a third of the other states did. Clearly, this is not to be taken 
seriously and no doubt there are other bases for classifying states (more or less plausible) that 
yield even more striking contrasts. The point, again, is to illustrate the inferential problems we 
face when it is possible to generate many more hypotheses than the data can properly address. 
Consequently, the stories we glean from large-scale education databases of this sort will likely be 
a great deal more Delphic than either researchers or policymakers would prefer. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Overall Means for NAEP Data for Grades 4 and 8 
Grade 4 Grade 8  
1992 2000 1992 2000 
State Abbrev. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. 
National (Public) NAT 218.58 0.80 6.52 226.24 0.96 7.47 266.87 0.96 6.39 274.42 0.84 7.39 
Alabama AL 208.33 1.56 4.51 217.94 1.41 5.78 252.19 1.66 5.45 262.16 1.77 4.94 
Georgia GA 215.59 1.23 5.23 219.56 1.06 6.51 259.36 1.16 4.68 266.33 1.25 7.20 
Indiana IN 221.04 1.04 3.32 234.42 1.08 6.78 270.10 1.14 4.58 283.05 1.45 7.30 
Louisiana LA 204.14 1.46 4.00 217.96 1.40 7.68 249.98 1.66 4.27 258.98 1.50 5.76 
Maryland MD 217.32 1.28 4.05 222.31 1.27 8.93 264.83 1.28 4.68 276.01 1.43 10.56 
Minnesota MN 228.49 0.90 3.36 235.27 1.32 5.80 282.39 0.96 3.46 287.65 1.44 5.49 
Mississippi MS 201.83 1.08 4.85 210.97 1.07 4.26 246.46 1.18 7.17 254.03 1.30 7.47 
New Mexico NM 213.30 1.44 7.35 213.87 1.48 12.30 259.61 0.90 5.34 259.84 1.74 11.55 
New York NY 218.45 1.25 5.29 226.56 1.33 11.53 266.42 2.08 8.49 276.26 2.09 13.13 
North Carolina NC 212.88 1.09 3.86 232.46 1.00 13.34 258.41 1.17 3.26 280.13 1.13 13.85 
Ohio OH 218.71 1.18 6.04 230.57 1.33 9.95 268.12 1.52 6.09 282.67 1.48 8.70 
South Carolina SC 212.50 1.08 4.81 220.42 1.39 7.46 260.77 0.97 5.91 266.35 1.39 6.85 
Tennessee TN 210.95 1.35 3.87 219.84 1.49 3.77 258.83 1.39 4.89 263.44 1.72 4.56 
Texas TX 217.92 1.21 7.58 232.67 1.21 15.44 264.59 1.30 6.58 274.85 1.47 9.57 
Hi-stakes  
states 
Virginia VA 220.76 1.30 5.24 230.39 1.27 10.79 267.86 1.16 5.28 276.67 1.50 9.97 
National (Public) NAT 218.58 0.80 6.52 226.24 0.96 7.47 266.87 0.96 6.39 274.42 0.84 7.39 
Arizona AZ 215.25 1.07 4.93 218.77 1.42 11.85 265.37 1.26 5.71 270.72 1.53 9.08 
Arkansas AR 210.21 0.89 5.43 217.06 1.13 6.58 256.31 1.19 6.24 261.36 1.37 8.18 
California CA 208.40 1.56 12.20 213.57 1.84 8.96 260.89 1.66 8.26 262.17 2.04 8.68 
Connecticut CT 226.80 1.13 6.58 234.24 1.16 9.95 273.74 1.14 6.59 281.90 1.37 10.19 
Hawaii HI 214.06 1.31 5.75 215.85 1.15 10.17 257.41 0.86 4.86 262.77 1.34 7.28 
Idaho ID 221.56 0.96 3.45 226.89 1.21 5.91 275.09 0.74 3.17 277.92 1.31 4.76 
Kentucky KY 215.05 1.01 3.29 220.99 1.17 8.24 262.24 1.11 4.56 271.56 1.40 9.47 
Maine ME 231.64 1.00 5.66 230.57 0.92 10.12 278.64 0.98 4.43 283.64 1.19 8.56 
Massachusetts MA 226.60 1.17 6.99 234.96 1.12 10.44 272.78 1.05 8.14 283.12 1.25 12.13 
Michigan MI 219.88 1.71 5.26 230.89 1.43 8.37 267.35 1.39 6.06 278.45 1.60 6.54 
Missouri MO 222.22 1.19 4.37 228.55 1.19 9.71 271.13 1.19 4.47 273.58 1.46 8.58 
Nebraska NE 225.33 1.23 4.13 225.95 1.72 7.58 277.65 1.11 4.07 280.62 1.12 3.50 
North Dakota ND 228.66 0.77 1.74 230.89 0.86 5.72 283.21 1.14 2.40 283.07 1.07 3.80 
Oklahoma OK 220.32 0.98 7.29 225.04 1.26 10.47 268.13 1.15 6.30 271.65 1.48 8.61 
Rhode Island RI 215.45 1.53 5.81 224.63 1.22 11.70 265.91 0.73 5.10 273.43 1.11 11.77 
Utah UT 224.04 0.97 4.03 227.29 1.22 6.66 274.34 0.73 4.37 275.44 1.16 5.82 
West Virginia WV 215.27 1.05 4.42 224.85 1.20 10.07 259.09 1.01 5.79 270.78 1.00 11.08 
Lo-stakes 
states 
Wyoming WY 225.38 0.93 3.52 229.25 1.30 6.07 275.08 0.86 3.95 276.69 1.18 3.96 
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Table A2 
Overall Means for NAEP Data for Cohort Analysis 
Cohort (1992 to 1996)  Cohort (1996 to 2000)  
Grade 4 (1992) Grade 8 (1996) Grade 4 (1996) Grade 8 (2000) 
State Abbrev. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. 
National (Public) NAT 218.58 0.80 6.52 270.51 1.21 4.84 222.34 1.03 6.36 274.42 0.84 7.39 
Alabama AL 208.33 1.56 4.51 256.59 2.15 7.15 211.65 1.24 6.28 262.16 1.77 4.94 
Florida FL 213.69 1.50 8.26 263.64 1.84 9.82 215.76 1.16 9.95 *** *** *** 
Georgia GA 215.59 1.23 5.23 262.47 1.65 6.99 215.46 1.49 7.23 266.33 1.25 7.20 
Indiana IN 221.04 1.04 3.32 275.53 1.44 5.61 229.39 1.05 5.28 283.05 1.45 7.30 
Louisiana LA 204.14 1.46 4.00 252.38 1.57 5.96 209.02 1.11 7.66 258.98 1.50 5.76 
Maryland MD 217.32 1.28 4.05 269.68 2.13 6.67 220.69 1.56 7.68 276.01 1.43 10.56 
Minnesota MN 228.49 0.90 3.36 284.05 1.34 2.96 232.19 1.08 6.12 287.65 1.44 5.49 
Mississippi MS 201.83 1.08 4.85 250.22 1.19 6.72 208.43 1.22 5.97 254.03 1.30 7.47 
Nevada NV *** *** *** *** *** *** 217.62 1.30 8.90 268.18 0.94 10.17 
New Mexico NM 213.30 1.44 7.35 261.97 1.22 7.80 213.84 1.75 11.94 259.84 1.74 11.55 
New York NY 218.45 1.25 5.29 270.23 1.66 7.63 222.63 1.24 7.80 276.26 2.09 13.13 
North Carolina NC 212.88 1.09 3.86 267.83 1.42 4.45 224.33 1.19 6.89 280.13 1.13 13.85 
South Carolina SC 212.50 1.08 4.81 260.78 1.54 5.79 213.19 1.30 5.65 266.35 1.39 6.85 
Tennessee TN 210.95 1.35 3.87 263.12 1.40 4.33 219.18 1.40 6.40 263.44 1.72 4.56 
Texas TX 217.92 1.21 7.58 270.20 1.43 8.64 228.71 1.36 10.32 274.85 1.47 9.57 
Hi-stakes  
states 
Virginia VA 220.76 1.30 5.24 269.75 1.56 7.26 222.64 1.36 6.68 276.67 1.50 9.97 
National (Public) NAT 218.58 0.80 6.52 270.51 1.21 4.84 222.34 1.03 6.36 274.42 0.84 7.39 
Arizona AZ 215.25 1.07 4.93 267.87 1.56 8.52 217.58 1.73 12.42 270.72 1.53 9.08 
Arkansas AR 210.21 0.89 5.43 261.65 1.52 7.01 215.85 1.46 6.69 261.36 1.37 8.18 
California CA 208.40 1.56 12.20 262.77 1.85 9.99 209.13 1.84 15.75 262.17 2.04 8.68 
Colorado CO 221.02 0.97 5.24 275.61 1.09 4.41 225.81 1.04 8.38 *** *** *** 
Connecticut CT 226.80 1.13 6.58 279.59 1.12 8.28 232.03 1.10 8.09 281.90 1.37 10.19 
Delaware DE 217.90 0.78 5.30 266.73 0.95 8.64 215.03 0.64 7.04 *** *** *** 
Hawaii HI 214.06 1.31 5.75 262.13 0.97 5.21 214.97 1.45 5.78 262.77 1.34 7.28 
Iowa IA 229.88 1.02 3.26 283.99 1.31 5.23 229.13 1.08 5.62 *** *** *** 
Kentucky KY 215.05 1.01 3.29 266.59 1.07 4.69 219.99 1.07 5.72 271.56 1.40 9.47 
Maine ME 231.64 1.00 5.66 284.06 1.29 4.71 232.21 1.02 7.52 283.64 1.19 8.56 
Massachusetts MA 226.60 1.17 6.99 277.57 1.74 8.02 228.97 1.35 9.02 283.12 1.25 12.13 
Michigan MI 219.88 1.71 5.26 276.87 1.79 5.12 226.26 1.27 6.17 278.45 1.60 6.54 
Missouri MO 222.22 1.19 4.37 273.28 1.39 7.10 224.73 1.07 4.94 273.58 1.46 8.58 
Montana MT *** *** *** 283.00 1.30 3.22 227.52 1.23 4.77 286.58 1.22 5.44 
Nebraska NE 225.33 1.23 4.13 282.77 1.02 4.33 227.54 1.18 5.02 280.62 1.12 3.50 
North Dakota ND 228.66 0.77 1.74 284.22 0.91 3.32 230.90 1.23 3.56 283.07 1.07 3.80 
Oregon OR *** *** *** 276.34 1.47 3.92 223.48 1.35 8.77 280.64 1.65 6.19 
Rhode Island RI 215.45 1.53 5.81 268.88 0.92 7.18 220.42 1.39 6.16 273.43 1.11 11.77 
Utah UT 224.04 0.97 4.03 276.77 1.03 6.06 226.52 1.15 5.79 275.44 1.16 5.82 
Vermont VT *** *** *** 279.25 0.95 4.29 224.88 1.22 6.08 283.41 1.10 9.54 
West Virginia WV 215.27 1.05 4.42 264.87 1.02 8.49 223.35 1.01 8.34 270.78 1.00 11.08 
Lo-stakes 
states 
Wisconsin WI 228.69 1.07 5.23 282.85 1.53 7.22 231.41 0.96 7.77 *** *** *** 
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 Wyoming WY 225.38 0.93 3.52 274.78 0.91 1.79 223.20 1.38 4.14 276.69 1.18 3.96 
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Table A3 
NAEP Data for Grades 4 & 8—25th Percentile  
 Grade 4 Grade 8  
1992 2000 1992 2000 
State Abbrev. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. 
National (Public) NAT 197.43 0.83 6.52 206.01 1.37 7.47 241.67 1.54 6.39 250.23 0.92 7.39 
Alabama AL 186.19 1.56 4.51 198.99 1.57 5.78 227.94 1.94 5.45 238.66 1.61 4.94 
Georgia GA 193.74 1.38 5.23 199.37 2.05 6.51 235.74 1.52 4.68 241.94 2.17 7.20 
Indiana IN 201.76 1.35 3.32 217.40 1.84 6.78 247.81 1.45 4.58 262.95 1.46 7.30 
Louisiana LA 183.26 2.61 4.00 199.27 1.44 7.68 227.41 2.61 4.27 236.46 2.19 5.76 
Maryland MD 193.40 2.14 4.05 199.92 2.20 8.93 237.90 2.53 4.68 250.76 1.42 10.56 
Minnesota MN 209.48 1.07 3.36 217.57 1.49 5.80 261.12 1.13 3.46 268.36 2.08 5.49 
Mississippi MS 180.49 1.65 4.85 191.72 1.58 4.26 222.43 1.11 7.17 232.95 1.93 7.47 
New Mexico NM 193.25 1.90 7.35 194.81 2.13 12.30 238.48 1.07 5.34 239.06 2.63 11.55 
New York NY 197.68 0.90 5.29 207.19 2.74 11.53 241.93 2.65 8.49 254.36 2.50 13.13 
North Carolina NC 190.45 1.32 3.86 214.50 1.29 13.34 234.58 1.53 3.26 256.92 2.03 13.85 
Ohio OH 198.22 1.49 6.04 212.60 1.78 9.95 245.39 1.92 6.09 262.54 2.22 8.70 
South Carolina SC 191.18 1.15 4.81 200.81 1.47 7.46 236.28 1.22 5.91 243.31 1.43 6.85 
Tennessee TN 190.50 2.09 3.87 199.96 1.82 3.77 236.01 1.46 4.89 240.19 1.97 4.56 
Texas TX 198.33 1.63 7.58 215.62 1.55 15.44 238.59 1.25 6.58 254.68 1.88 9.57 
Hi-stakes  
states 
Virginia VA 199.36 1.56 5.24 212.13 1.41 10.79 244.00 1.75 5.28 254.04 1.43 9.97 
National (Public) NAT 197.43 0.83 6.52 206.01 1.37 7.47 241.67 1.54 6.39 250.23 0.92 7.39 
California CA 184.59 2.29 12.20 190.62 3.06 8.96 234.77 2.69 8.26 236.85 1.50 8.68 
Kentucky KY 195.22 0.92 3.29 202.18 1.42 8.24 239.48 1.68 4.56 250.50 1.36 9.47 
Massachusetts MA 207.20 1.52 6.99 217.83 1.52 10.44 249.66 2.04 8.14 262.67 1.68 12.13 
Michigan MI 199.93 2.66 5.26 211.37 1.47 8.37 244.02 2.16 6.06 255.94 2.63 6.54 
Missouri MO 203.07 1.44 4.37 211.80 1.17 9.71 249.52 1.83 4.47 253.71 2.14 8.58 
Oklahoma OK 202.83 0.78 7.29 209.85 1.09 10.47 248.03 1.28 6.30 251.88 2.20 8.61 
West Virginia WV 195.79 1.68 4.42 208.48 0.89 10.07 238.11 0.97 5.79 250.95 2.53 11.08 
Arizona AZ 194.62 2.30 4.93 197.85 1.92 11.85 243.87 1.40 5.71 248.11 2.88 9.08 
Arkansas AR 189.54 1.35 5.43 197.70 1.16 6.58 234.09 1.48 6.24 239.08 2.40 8.18 
Connecticut CT 206.41 1.36 6.58 215.94 2.07 9.95 249.75 1.39 6.59 258.54 1.39 10.19 
Hawaii HI 191.80 2.05 5.75 195.94 1.60 10.17 232.05 1.05 4.86 239.91 1.65 7.28 
Idaho ID 203.53 1.90 3.45 210.44 1.47 5.91 255.49 0.94 3.17 257.78 1.29 4.76 
Maine ME 213.90 1.71 5.66 213.44 1.85 10.12 259.10 1.14 4.43 263.10 1.80 8.56 
Nebraska NE 205.72 1.56 4.13 206.20 2.61 7.58 257.28 1.35 4.07 260.51 1.92 3.50 
North Dakota ND 211.92 1.05 1.74 214.13 1.49 5.72 264.64 1.25 2.40 264.75 1.85 3.80 
Rhode Island RI 195.24 3.28 5.81 205.89 1.68 11.70 243.87 1.47 5.10 250.52 2.12 11.77 
Utah UT 205.63 1.13 4.03 208.76 1.83 6.66 253.82 1.37 4.37 254.10 1.96 5.82 
Lo-stakes 
states 
Wyoming WY 208.57 1.56 3.52 212.13 2.21 6.07 255.13 1.05 3.95 256.90 1.66 3.96 
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Table A4 
NAEP Data for Cohort Analysis—25th Percentile 
Cohort (1992 to 1996)  Cohort (1996 to 2000)  
Grade 4 (1992) Grade 8 (1996) Grade 4 (1996) Grade 8 (2000) 
 State Abbrev. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. Score s.e. % Excl. 
National (Public) NAT 197.43 0.83 6.52 246.71 1.32 4.84 201.49 1.31 6.36 250.23 0.92 7.39 
Alabama AL 186.19 1.56 4.51 233.09 2.26 7.15 190.12 1.40 6.28 238.66 1.61 4.94 
Florida FL 193.07 1.81 8.26 240.26 2.14 9.82 194.89 1.38 9.95 xxx xxx xxx 
Georgia GA 193.74 1.38 5.23 237.74 3.33 6.99 195.38 1.97 7.23 241.94 2.17 7.20 
Indiana IN 201.76 1.35 3.32 255.12 2.27 5.61 211.48 1.20 5.28 262.95 1.46 7.30 
Louisiana LA 183.26 2.61 4.00 231.62 1.95 5.96 189.56 1.24 7.66 236.46 2.19 5.76 
Maryland MD 193.40 2.14 4.05 242.34 2.28 6.67 197.44 1.74 7.68 250.76 1.42 10.56 
Minnesota MN 209.48 1.07 3.36 262.11 1.48 2.96 214.60 2.36 6.12 268.36 2.08 5.49 
Mississippi MS 180.49 1.65 4.85 227.84 1.54 6.72 188.23 1.17 5.97 232.95 1.93 7.47 
Nevada NV xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 198.44 2.65 8.90 245.65 1.30 10.17 
New Mexico NM 193.25 1.90 7.35 239.56 1.38 7.80 193.33 2.78 11.94 239.06 2.63 11.55 
New York NY 197.68 0.90 5.29 247.24 2.73 7.63 203.19 2.47 7.80 254.36 2.50 13.13 
North Carolina NC 190.45 1.32 3.86 243.79 1.43 4.45 203.95 1.96 6.89 256.92 2.03 13.85 
South Carolina SC 191.18 1.15 4.81 237.73 1.78 5.79 192.69 1.88 5.65 243.31 1.43 6.85 
Tennessee TN 190.50 2.09 3.87 240.50 1.66 4.33 199.29 1.87 6.40 240.19 1.97 4.56 
Texas TX 198.33 1.63 7.58 246.64 1.92 8.64 208.78 2.16 10.32 254.68 1.88 9.57 
Hi-stakes  
states 
Virginia VA 199.36 1.56 5.24 246.25 1.14 7.26 202.05 1.86 6.68 254.04 1.43 9.97 
National (Public) NAT 197.43 0.83 6.52 246.71 1.32 4.84 201.49 1.31 6.36 250.23 0.92 7.39 
Arizona AZ 194.62 2.30 4.93 246.13 1.41 8.52 197.92 1.20 12.42 248.11 2.88 9.08 
Arkansas AR 189.54 1.35 5.43 238.89 1.81 7.01 195.26 1.65 6.69 239.08 2.40 8.18 
California CA 184.59 2.29 12.20 237.10 2.35 9.99 186.48 1.57 15.75 236.85 1.50 8.68 
Colorado CO 201.45 1.01 5.24 253.51 1.30 4.41 206.62 1.41 8.38 xxx xxx xxx 
Connecticut CT 206.41 1.36 6.58 256.53 1.23 8.28 213.74 1.67 8.09 258.54 1.39 10.19 
Delaware DE 195.68 1.74 5.30 243.40 1.81 8.64 193.38 1.89 7.04 xxx xxx xxx 
Hawaii HI 191.80 2.05 5.75 237.88 1.01 5.21 192.54 2.13 5.78 239.91 1.65 7.28 
Iowa IA 211.76 1.29 3.26 264.42 0.98 5.23 212.98 1.37 5.62 xxx xxx xxx 
Kentucky KY 195.22 0.92 3.29 245.60 1.36 4.69 200.64 2.61 5.72 250.50 1.36 9.47 
Maine ME 213.90 1.71 5.66 264.62 1.07 4.71 214.34 1.16 7.52 263.10 1.80 8.56 
Massachusetts MA 207.20 1.52 6.99 254.60 2.71 8.02 210.79 2.03 9.02 262.67 1.68 12.13 
Michigan MI 199.93 2.66 5.26 253.20 2.35 5.12 206.67 1.34 6.17 255.94 2.63 6.54 
Missouri MO 203.07 1.44 4.37 251.99 1.81 7.10 206.18 1.72 4.94 253.71 2.14 8.58 
Montana MT xxx xxx xxx 262.24 1.52 3.22 209.86 2.15 4.77 267.22 1.99 5.44 
Nebraska NE 205.72 1.56 4.13 262.92 1.49 4.33 208.87 1.85 5.02 260.51 1.92 3.50 
North Dakota ND 211.92 1.05 1.74 264.60 1.28 3.32 214.20 1.39 3.56 264.75 1.85 3.80 
Oregon OR xxx xxx xxx 253.60 2.33 3.92 203.69 1.41 8.77 258.06 1.13 6.19 
Rhode Island RI 195.24 3.28 5.81 245.93 1.77 7.18 201.53 1.39 6.16 250.52 2.12 11.77 
Utah UT 205.63 1.13 4.03 256.84 1.48 6.06 208.14 2.05 5.79 254.10 1.96 5.82 
Vermont VT xxx xxx xxx 258.86 1.45 4.29 205.96 1.67 6.08 262.27 1.44 9.54 
West Virginia WV 195.79 1.68 4.42 243.68 1.22 8.49 204.10 0.79 8.34 250.95 2.53 11.08 
Lo-stakes 
states 
Wisconsin WI 210.39 0.47 5.23 262.07 2.25 7.22 213.19 0.90 7.77 xxx xxx xxx 
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 Wyoming WY 208.57 1.56 3.52 255.73 1.22 1.79 204.54 1.74 4.14 256.90 1.66 3.96 
 
